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1. INTRODUCTION
LaNisa Allen is a new mother, and, like any mom, she wants the best for
her son.' Following doctors' recommendations, LaNisa decides to breastfeed
her son in order to provide him with the best nourishment possible.2 In order
to help support her new family, LaNisa secures a position through a
temporary service at the Totes factory as a general laborer repackaging
leather gloves and earning $8.75 per hour.3 LaNisa hopes to continue
breastfeeding when starting work and plans to use a breast pump at work to
maintain her milk supply. 4 She must pump for approximately fifteen minutes
every three to four hours to prevent her breasts from becoming engorged and
leaking and her milk supply drying up.5
Prior to beginning work, LaNisa informs her employer that she is still
breastfeeding her infant son and requests break time and a location to express
her milk.6 Her work schedule is 6:00 a.m. until 2:30 p.m. with two unpaid,
ten-minute breaks at 8:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. and a half-hour, unpaid lunch
break at 11:00 a.m.7 Totes responds that LaNisa may only use her breast
pump during her lunch break at 11:00 a.m., five hours into her shift, and that
she will have to pump in the ladies' restroom. 8 When LaNisa requests at least
a chair to sit on while she expresses her milk, her employer denies her
request.9 LaNisa responds that she does not know whether she can wait until
IThese facts are a variation on the facts in Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., No. CVO6-
03-0917, 2007 WL 5843192 (Ohio Corn. P1. July 31, 2007), affd, Butler App. No.
CA2007-08-196 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2008), affidper curiam, 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio
2009).
2 For a discussion of the health and nutritional benefits of breastmilc for infants, see
discussion infra Part II.A.
3 Merit Brief of Appellant LaNisa Allen, Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d
622 (Ohio 2009) (No. 08-0845), 2008 V& 5042218 at *2-3 [hereinafter Brief of
Appellant].
4 Id. at *3.
5 Allen, 2007 WL 5843192.
6Id
7Id
8Id
9Id
1282 Vol. 71:6
2010] LA CTA TION DISCRIMNA TION 18
11:00 a.m., but at her employer's refusal to consider a different schedule,
LaNisa says that she will try.'10
For a week, LaNisa feeds her son before she leaves for work, but by
11:00 a.m., over five hours since last expressing her milk, LaNisa's breasts
are engorged and leaking and she is in terrible pain."I LaNisa begins going to
the restroom around 10:00 a.m. to express her milk, which she does every
day for two weeks without incident.' 2 All employees are permitted to take
unscheduled restroom breaks as needed throughout the day to attend to
bodily functions.' 3 One day, LaNisa's supervisor sees her in the restroom
pumping outside of her lunch break.' 4 Her supervisor reports the discovery
and LaNis a's need for an extended break to the manager, who decides to
terminate LaNisa for taking an unauthorized break1 5 -a break that was
necessary only because LaNisa was lactating and her employer refused to
give her a reasonable break time to express her milk.
LaNisa Allen's unfortunate story is true. When she sued her employer for
wrongful termination alleging pregnancy discrimination, the Supreme Court
of Ohio ultimately held that she was terminated for taking an unauthorized
break, in violation of her employer's policy, and that her employer's reason
was not a mere pretext for pregnancy discrimination.' 6 Thus, the Court
refuised to consider whether workplace lactation is within the scope of Ohio's
pregnancy discrimination laws.' 7 The case garnered national attention, and
may have galvanized timely lobbying efforts, just as Congress was
considering the Health Care Reform Bill. 18
Until the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(commonly known as Health Care Reform) in March of 2010,19 employers
did not have to accommodate the milk expression needs of breastfeeding and
lactating employees under then-existing federal law and the laws of most
10 Id.
I Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at *4.
12 Id. at *5.
13 Id. at *4.
14Allen, 2007 WL 5843192.
15 Id
16 Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622, 624 (Ohio 2009) (per curiam).
'7 Id
18 See Senator Jeff Merkley, Why We Must Stand Up for the Right to Breastfeed,
MOMSRJSING.ORG (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.momsrising.org/blog/why-we-must-stand-
up-for-the-right-to-breastfeed/ ("This ruling by the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirms why
it's important that Congress include [the amendment to provide new mothers with
flexible break times and privacy to pump breast milk] in the health reform legislation.").
19 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111- 148, § 4207, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
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states.20 If employees attempted to attend to these needs at work, they could
be fired for it, as LaNisa was.21 Under federal law as it was interpreted prior
to March 2010, the actions of LaNisa's employer were perfectly legal.2 2 And
many states, including Ohio, have no laws explicitly protecting milk
expression in the workplace. 23
Women who breastfeed and work after having a child face a difficult
choice of whether to start and continue breastfeeding. This decision requires
that a woman continue to express her milk approximately every three hours
to maintain her milk supply, prevent leakage, and avoid pain, as well as
potential medical complications. 24 The availability of breast pumps allows
women to financially provide for their families while continuing to provide
their babies' nutrition.25 But until the enactment of Health Care Reform, an
employer could refuse to allow a woman to pump at work or fire her for
doing so, effectively removing any real "choice" she had.2 6 Health Care
Reform now requires that employers provide nursing mothers reasonable
break time as needed by the employee in order to express milk at work for
her nursing child.27 This is a significant step toward promoting breastfeeding
20 5See, e.g., Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see
also Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, The Impact of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act on the Workplace-From a Legal and Social Perspective, 36 U. MEM.
L. REv. 93, 122-23 (2005) ("Not the PDA's prohibition against pregnancy-related
discrimination, Title VII's prohibition against gender discrimination, the Americans with
Disabilities Act .... nor the FMLA provide women any rights regarding [breastfeeding
and the need to pump breast milk during the workday]."); infra Parts III & IV.
21 See infra Part IV.
22 See infra part IV.
23 See infra Part III.
24 GAEPRYOR & KATHLEEN HuGGiNs, NuRsIG MOTHER, WORKING MOTHER 127
(2007) (recommending that mothers pump for fifteen to thirty minutes at least every three
hours). In addition to drying up of the milk supply and discomfort, a woman may
experience plugged ducts and breast infections if unable to breastfeed or otherwise
express milk for an extended period of time. LA LEcHE LEAGUE INT'L, THE WOMANLY
ART OF BREASTFEEDING 151 (7th ed. 2004).
25 See Colette Bouchez, Breast Pumps: The Working Mom's Friend, WEBMD (July
29, 2008), http://www.webmd.com/parenting/baby/breastfeeding-9/breast-pump?page=2
("Among today's working moms, breast pumps allow many women to give their baby the
benefits of mother's milk even when they can't be together all the time. Breast pumps are
devices designed to help you package Mother Nature by expressing your milk, then
storing it in the refrigerator to use for bottle feedings later.").
26 See Elissa Aaronson Goodman, Note, Breas~ffeeding or Bust: The Need for
Legislation to Protect a Mother's Right to Express Breast Milk at Work, 10 CARDOZO
WoMEN's L.J. 146, 150 (2003) ("Women, especially those who work, may face an
illusory choice in determining how to feed their newborns, with breastfeeding often
seeming like an impractical option.").
27 29 U.S.C.A. § 207 (West 2010).
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and making it possible for mothers to continue breastfeeding after returning
to work. This national requirement for accommodation is particularly
important, given the variation in state laws in this area.28
Despite this great stride, however, working mothers are still vulnerable
under the law. While employers have a duty of accommodation, any
provision prohibiting employment discrimination against women exercising
their rights under this law is startlingly absent from the law. Without an
explicit statement that discrimination on the basis of lactation is prohibited,
nursing mothers who still face adverse employment actions because of their
status as lactating women must look to other laws for recourse. The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 29 which amended Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,30 prohibits discrimination on the basis of
"pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,"3' and may still
provide the protection working mothers need, despite prior unfavorable
decisions by the federal courts in this area.32
Thus far federal courts have failed to interpret Title VII and the PDA as
offering any protection to breastfeeding and lactating mothers in the
workplace. 33 Congress has failed to correct the interpretations of the lower
courts either by amending the PDA to clarify its intent regarding
breastfeeding and lactation or including a non-discrimination provision in the
new Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers law. 34 While there is clear
protection from discrimination under some state laws, this protection is
dramatically inconsistent from state to state. 35 Further national protection is
necessary for this critical nationwide issue.36
28 See infra Part Ill.
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) (amending Title V1i's prohibition on sex
discrimination in employment to include "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions").
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis
of sex).
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
3 2 See infra Part V.
33 See infra Part IV. While other legal provisions such as the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the constitutional
right to privacy have been used, also largely unsuccessfully, to advance women's rights
in this area, this Note focuses on Title VII and the PDA as the statutes having the most
obvious connection to breastfeeding discrimination and, therefore, the areas of existing
law most likely to succeed in protecting breastfeeding women in the workplace. See infra
note 117 and accompanying text.
34 See infra Part Ill.
35 See infra Part Ill.
36 Promotion of breastfeeding is on the national health agenda, with the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention setting objectives for rates of breastfeeding to be
2010] 285
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Congress has already spoken in the PDA, and the PDA should be
interpreted to protect lactation. A concurring opinion in the Supreme Court
of Ohio in LaNisa Allen's case suggests another possible approach for Title
VII-PDA arguments in federal courts. 37 Successfuil Title VII cases are needed
not only to protect lactating women in the workplace, but also to prompt a
split among the circuits. Potentially, divergent cases can propel the issue to
the Supreme Court. If the Court adheres to the line of reasoning articulated in
this Note, it would make clear that lactation is protected under the PDA. If
the Court were instead to follow the reasoning used by most lower courts to
date, then perhaps Congress would recognize its oversight and respond with
an appropriate amendment to either the PDA or the Nursing Mothers law to
prohibit discrimination.
This Note seeks to describe the current state of the law related to
breastfeeding and lactation discrimination and to present a new approach to
litigating a lactation discrimination claim. Part 11 of this Note discusses the
many benefits to breastfeeding not only for infants and mothers but also for
employers and society. 38 Part 11 also describes the current rates of
breastfeeding in the U.S. as well as employment barriers to breastfeeding for
working mothers. 39 Part III examines the new federal law for nursing
mothers while highlighting the need for further protection from
discrimination for nursing moms in the workplace.40 Part IV chronicles the
development of pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and examines the subsequent treatment of breastfeeding
litigation by federal courts.1 1 Finally, Part V assesses the adequacy of current
legislative protection and proposes a new approach to PDA litigation based
upon drawing a distinction between lactation and breastfeeding in order to
persuade courts that the physiological process of lactation, unlike the social
act of breastfeeding, is within the ambit of the PDA.1 2
achieved in the U.S. under its Healthy People 2010 initiative. See Department of Health
and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Breastfeeding Report
Card-United States, 2009 [hereinafter Breastfeeding Report Card], available at
http://www.cdc.govfbreastfeeding/pdf/2009BreastfeedingReportCard.pdf.
37 See Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009) (per curiam)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
3 8 See infra Part L.A.
3 9 See infra Part lI.B.
40 See infra Part Ill.
41 See infra Part IV.
42 See infra Part V.
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II. BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF BREASTFEEDING
An examination of the benefits of breastfeeding, the current rate of
breastfeeding in the U.S., and workplace barriers to improving that rate are
preliminary to understanding why breastfeeding should be promoted and
protected by the law. This section essentially provides an introduction to the
status of breastfeeding in the U.S., beginning with an overview of the many
benefits of breastfeeding.43 These benefits are then juxtaposed to the current
rates of breastfeeding in the U.S.44 Although many social and cultural
barriers to improving the breastfeeding rate exist, the section concludes by
considering, in particular, workplace barriers to breastfeeding. 45 This
discussion sets the stage for why further change in the law is needed.
A. Benefits of Breastfeeding
Breastfeeding is highly beneficial to children, mothers, families, and
society.46 These benefits are manifold, affecting health, nutrition,
immunology, growth and physical development, psychology, society, the
economy, and the environment. 47
Health benefits from breastfeeding accrue to both infants and mothers.48
The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) endorses breastfeeding as the
optimal and "uniquely superior" form of nutrition for infants.49 AAP
recommends breastfeeding exclusively for the first six months of infancy,
with continuation of breastfeeding through at least the first year of the child's
life.50 Breastfed babies have decreased incidence and severity of infectious
43 See infra Part II.A.
44 See infra Part II.B.
45 See infra Part II.B.
46 American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Breastfeeding and the Use of
Human Milk, 115 PEDIATRICS 496, 496 (2005).
47 Id
48 Id. at 496-97.
49 Id. One of breastfeeding's strongest champions is renowned pediatrician, Dr.
William Sears. See WILLIAM SEARS & MARTHA SEARS, THE FAMILY NuTRITIoN BOOK
232 (1999) ("Human milk truly is the gold standard when it comes to infant nutrition.");
ASKDR.SEARS.COM, http://www.askdrsears.com/default.asp (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
But see Hanna Rosin, The Case Against Breast-Feeding, THE ATLANTIC, April 2009,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/04/the-case-against-
breast-feeding/73 11 / (arguing that the health claims about the benefits of breastmilk have
been grossly overstated, based upon review of medical literature and physician
interviews).
50 American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 46, at 499. This recommendation is
shared by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Academy
2010] 1287
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diseases, including bacterial meningitis, diarrhea, respiratory tract infection,
and urinary tract infection.5' Sudden infant death syndrome 52 in the first year
of life and post-neonatal infant mortality53 have also been found to occur at
reduced rates among breastfed infants.54 Older children and adults who were
breastfed also face less risk of developing type 1 and type 2 diabetes,
lymphoma, leukemia, Hodgkin disease, obesity, high cholesterol, and
asthma.55 Breastfeeding may also have neurodevelopment benefits, with
studies showing slightly enhanced performance on tests of cognitive
development by children who were breastfed.56 Mothers who breastfeed also
experience positive health benefits, such as decreased post-partumn bleeding,
decreased risk of breast and ovarian cancer, as well as a possible decreased
risk of postmenopausal osteoporosis and hip fractures. 57 Breastfeeding also
helps women return to their pre-pregnancy weight.58
Benefits of breastfeeding are not limited to mothers and their children,
but also extend to employers and the larger society. Mothers who choose to
breastfeed, when this choice is available, save costs to employers and the
U.S. health care system, as well as benefit the environment. 59 Because of the
of Family Physicians, Academy of Breastfeeding Medicine, World Health Organization,
United Nations Children's Fund, and many other health organizations. Id. at 498.
51 Id. at 496. Other infectious diseases with reduced incidence and severity in
breastfed infants include bacteremia, necrotizing enterocolitis, otitis media, and late-onset
sepsis in preterm infants. Id.
52 "Sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) is the sudden death of an infant under age
1 that cannot be explained after a thorough investigation has been conducted, including a
complete autopsy, an examination of the death scene, and a review of the clinical
history." Definitions, NATIONAL SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED INFANT/CHiLD DEATH &
PREGNANCY Loss RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.sidscenter.org/definitions.html#5a
(last visited Mar. 12, 20 10).
53 Post-neonatal infant mortality is the rate of death between the ages of twenty-
eight days to under one year. Id.
54 American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 46, at 496. The AAP reports that
post-neonatal infant mortality rates in the United States are reduced by 2 1% in breastfed
infants. Id. (citing Aimin Chen & Walter J. Rogan, Breastfeeding and the Risk of
Postneonatal Death in the United States, 113 PEDIATRJCs e435, e437 (2004), available at
http://pediatrics.org/cgicontent/ftilUI113/5/e435). The Chen and Rogan study, however,
acknowledges that the effects of breast milk and breastfeeding cannot be separated
completely from other characteristics of the mother and child. Chen & Rogan, supra, at
e438. But, assuming causality, breastfeeding could potentially save or delay
approximately 720 infant deaths in the U.S. each year. Id. at e438-39.
55 American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 46, at 496-97.
56 Id. at 497.
57 Id.
59Id
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reduced incidence of short- and long-term health problems in breastfed
babies and their mothers, by supporting and accommodating the needs of
breastfeeding employees, employers can reduce health care costs, lost
productivity, and absenteeism. 60 Mothers of formula-fed infants require one-
day absences to care for sick children more than twice as often as mothers of
breastfed infants.6 ' Economically, reduced illness resulting from
breastfeeding could decrease annual health care costs in the U.S. by $3.6
billion.62 Breastfeeding also benefits the environment by reducing waste due
to formula packaging and energy requirements for production and
transportation of products required for formula feeding. 63 Society and
employers benefit when mothers choose to breastfeed.
B. Breastfeeding Rates and Workplace Barriers to Breastfeeding
Despite the tremendous benefits to breastfeeding, the rate of
breastfeeding in the U.S. trails behind national goals. The U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services' Healthy People 2010 initiative states the
Nation's health promotion and disease prevention agenda.64 Because of the
many benefits derived from breastfeeding, Healthy People 2010 contains
specific objectives for rates of breastfeeding in the year following birth: 75%
in the early post-partum period, 50% at six months, and 25% at one year.65
Of U.S. children born in 2006, 73.9% were breastfed at some point in the
early post-partum. period, with the percentage of children breastfeeding at six
months dropping to 43.4% and 22.7% at twelve months.66 At three months of
age, 33.1% of infants were breastfeeding exclusively, with that number
dropping to 13.6% at six months.67 Current breastfeeding rates are falling
short of the Healthy People 2010 goals.
Breastfeeding goals have not been achieved, in part, because of
substantial obstacles to women choosing to breastfeed their children. The
AAP reports that maternal employment is among the obstacles to initiation
and continuation of breastfeeding, particularly in the absence of workplace
60 Id; National Business Group on Health, Center for Prevention and Health
Services, Investing in Workplace Breastfeeding Programs and Policies, 1.2.
61 National Business Group on Health, supra note 60, at 1.2.
62 American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 46, at 497.
63 Id
64 About Healthy People 2010, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AN]) PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/healthyjpeople/hp2Ol 0.htmn (last updated Oct. 14, 2009).
65 Breas~ffeeding Report Card, supra note 36.
66 Id.
67 Id
2892010]
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facilities and support for breastfeeding.68 Studies have shown that a woman's
career plans are the most significant factor in determining the duration of
breastfeeding and whether she breastfeeds at all.69 Of employed women with
children under the age of one year, only 25% breastfed for at least a month
while working. 70 A major challenge for working women who breastfeed is
that they cannot go an entire work day without expressing milk and need
time throughout the day to do so. 7 1 Many employers have been unwilling to
provide women with the time and facilities to pump at work.72 In some cases,
employers have simply fired employees who attempt to breastfeed or express
milk in the workplace.73 Even with the new law mandating accommodation,
hostility toward the women who exercise their rights under the law will
undoubtedly still remain in some workplaces.
The workplace barriers facing working mothers are demonstrated, in
part, by the increase in pregnancy discrimination74 charges filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Indeed, pregnancy
discrimination, which includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical
conditions, 75 is one of the fastest-growing categories of employment
discrimination charges filed with the EEOC.76 It surpasses the percentage
68 American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 46, at 498. Other barriers include
insufficient prenatal education about breastfeeding, disruptive hospital policies and
practices, inappropriate interruption of breastfeeding, early hospital discharge, lack of
timely routine follow-up care and post-partumn home health visits, lack of family and
broad societal support, media portrayal of bottle feeding as normative, commercial
promotion of infant formula, misinformation, and lack of guidance and encouragement
from health care professionals. Id.
69 NainlBusiness Group on Health, supra note 60, at 1.3.
70 Id. at 1. 1.
71 PRYOR & HUGGINS, supra note 24, at 127.
72 See Henry Wyatt Christup, Litigating a Breastffeeding and Employment Case in
the New Millennium, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 263, 267 (2000).
73 See New Mothers' Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 1998, H.R. 3531, 105th Cong.
§ 2(19) (1998) ("Many employers deny women the opportunity to breastfeed or express
milk. Some women have been discharged for requesting to breastfeed or express milk
during lunch and other regular breaks. Some women have been harassed or discriminated
against.").
74 The EEOC defines pregnancy discrimination as "treating a woman (an applicant
or employee) unfavorably because of pregnancy, childbirth, or a medical condition
related to pregnancy or childbirth." Pregnancy Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/pregnancy.cfin (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
1142 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
76 Jennifer Yue, The Flood of Pregnancy Discrimination Cases: Balancing the
Interests of Pregnant Women and Their Employers, 96 KY. L.J. 487, 487 (2008).
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increases in both sexual harassment and sex discrimination claims.77 Over
the last ten years, charges of pregnancy discrimination filed with the EEOC
and fair employment practices agencies (FEPAs) have increased over 48%
from 4,160 in fiscal year 2000 to 6,196 in fiscal year 2009.78 The rise in
pregnancy discrimination charges reflects the resistance of employers to the
needs of a female workforce.
Children, women, employers, and society all benefit when a woman
chooses to breastfeed her child.79 However, women attempting to continue
breastfeeding after returning to work face severe obstacles in the workplace,
despite these benefits. Thus, many women are discouraged from
breastfeeding while working. A recent Act of Congress, however, recognized
these many benefits and has removed one barrier to women choosing to
breastfeed by imposing a duty on employers to accommodate the milk
expression needs of breastfeeding employees.80
III. CONGRESSIONAL POLICY: MANDATORY ACCOMMODATION
Enacted in March of 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (Health Care Reform) contained an amendment that now requires
employers to provide reasonable break time for nursing mothers. 8' The
legislation passed after a similar bill lay dormant in committee for twelve
years. 82 Prior to enactment of the law, the only protection for nursing
employees was that provided by twenty-four states, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico, which all had some form of workplace breastfeeding law on
the books.83 This Section first discusses the earlier failed attempts to get
77~ Id.
78 PennyDiscrimination Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined& FY 1997-FY
2009, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/pregnancy.cfm (last visited Jan. 11,
2010). Settling pregnancy discrimination claims has cost employers over $143 million in
direct monetary benefits to pregnancy discrimination complainants, not including
damages obtained through litigation. Id This figure also does not include the legal costs
associated with responding to EEOC charges and litigating disputes that cannot be
resolved before suit is brought. Id
79 For a cost-benefit analysis of providing breast-pumping breaks during the
workday, see Shana M. Christrup, Breastfeeding in the American Workplace, 9 Am. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'v & L. 471, 500-02 (2001).
80 See infra part III.
81 29 U.S.C.A. § 207 (West 2010).
82 See Acts cited infra note 84.
8 3 Breasoleding Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14389 (last updated Mar. 2010) [hereinafter
Breas6feeding Laws].
2912010]
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breastfeeding legislation through Congress, then describes the current state of
the law with the passage of Health Care Reform, and concludes with a
discussion of a critical difference in the proposed and enacted laws:
protection from discrimination on the basis of lactation.
A. Early Attempts at Protection for Nursing Mothers: Breastfeeding
Promotion Act
The Breastfeeding Promotion Act has been reintroduced in each
subsequent session of Congress since the 105th (1997-1998),84 without ever
getting out of committee. Most recently introduced into both the House and
Senate on June 11, 2009, the Breastfeeding Promotion Act85 had two major
goals: first, to require employers to accommodate the needs of working
mothers to express milk in the workplace,86 and second, to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of breastfeeding and expressing milk in the
workplace.87
In order to require accommodation by the employer, the Act sought to
amend the Fair Labor Standards Act. The following language was proposed:
An employer shall provide reasonable break time for an employee to
express breast milk for her nursing child for 1 year after the child's birth
each time such employee has need to express the milk. The employer shall
make reasonable efforts to provide a place, other than a bathroom, that is
shielded from view and free from intrusion from coworkers and the public,
which may be used by an employee to express breast milk. An employer
shall not be required to compensate an employee for any work time spent
for such purpose.88
84 See Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 2007, H.R. 2236, 110th Cong. (2007);
Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2005, H.R. 2122, 109th Cong. (2005);
Breastfeeding Promotion Act, H.R. 2790, 108th Cong. (2003); Pregnancy Discrimination
Act Amendments of 2003, S. 418, 108th Cong. (2003); Breastfeeding Promotion Act,
H.R. 285, 107th Cong. (2001); Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2001,
S. 256, 107th Cong. (2001); Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2000,
H.R. 3861, 106th Cong. (2000); Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2000,
S. 3023, 106th Cong. (2000); Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 1999,
H.R. 1478, 106th Cong. (1999); New Mothers' Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 1998,
H.R. 3531, 105th Cong. (1998).
85 S. 1244, 111 th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2819, 111 th Cong. (2009).
86S. 1244 § 501(a); H.R. 2819 § 501(a).
81 S 1244 § 10 1(b)(2); H.R. 2819 § 10l1(b)(2).
88 S. 1244 § 501 (a); see also H.R. 2819 § 501 (a).
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Additionally, the Act provided up to a $10,000 tax credit for employer
expenses for providing a location on the business premises where employed
mothers may breastfeed or express milk for their children.89
In order to prohibit discrimination, the Act proposed to amend the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act "to clarify that breastfeeding and expressing
breast milk in the workplace are protected conduct under the. ... [PDA3 *"90
The Act would have achieved this clarification by adding lactation to the list
of prohibited bases of discrimination in the PDA to read, "pregnancy,
childbirth (including lactation), or related medical conditions."9' With its
coverage of mandatory accommodations, non-discrimination, and employer
incentives, the Act was much more comprehensive than the law that recently
passed,
B. Health Care Reform: Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers
While the stand-alone Breastfeeding Promotion Act has languished in
committee for over a decade, the nursing mothers amendment slipped into
the massive 2,074-page Health Care Reform Bill relatively unnoticed.92
Introduced by Senator Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), 93 the amendment provides
mandatory accommodation for nursing mothers. It does so by amending the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) and requires the following: that (1)
employers provide a "reasonable break time" for an employee to express
breast milk at work; (2) such break time is provided each time the employee
"has need to express the milk"; (3) break time is provided for up to one year
after the birth of the child; and (4) the employer provide a private place, other
than a restroom, where the employee may express milk.94 These
requirements are nearly identical to those proposed by the stalled
Breastfeeding Promotion Act.95 The Department of Labor (DOL),
89 S. 1244 § 45R(b); H.R. 2819 § 45R(b).
90 S. 1244 § 101(b)(2); H.R. 2819 § 101(b)(2).
91 S. 1244 § 102(1) (emphasis added); H.R. 2819 § 102(1) (emphasis added). The
PDA stated that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006), while both the House and Senate
bills proposed amending the language "by inserting '(including lactation)' after
'childbirth'," S. 1244 § 102(1); H.R. 2819 § 102(1).
92 See Mary Agnes Carey, Phil Galewitz, & Laurie McGinley, 7 Items You Didn't
Know Were in the Senate Bill, MSNBC.Com, Nov. 30, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34209992/nsfhealth-health-care! (describing the nursing
mothers amendment as being in the "congressional tradition" of "adding pet interests that
otherwise might not pass to a big bill that at least will be put up for a vote").
93 Senator Merkley also introduced the Breastfeeding Promotion Act into the Senate.
94 29 U.S.C.A. § 207 (West 2010).
91 Compare 29 U.S.C.A. § 207, with S. 1244 § 501(a); H.R. 2819 § 501(a).
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responsible for administering the law, has provided some additional
guidance. 96 According to the DOL's fact sheet, the frequency and duration of
breaks will vary as needed by the nursing mother.97
There are, however, some limitations on the application of these
requirements. First, as an amendment to Section 7 of the FLSA, the provision
only applies to those employees who are not exempt from the ELSA's
overtime pay requirements-generally hourly, not salary, employees.98
Second, employers with fewer than fifty employees are exempt from the
requirements if the requirements would impose an undue hardship on the
employer in the form of "significant difficulty or expense when considered in
relation to the size, financial resources, nature, or structure of the employer's
business."99 Third, the employer is not required to compensate the employee
for any work time spent expressing milk. 100
However, the law does not preempt state laws that provide greater
protection than the new federal law.'10 1 There are some state variations on the
reasonable-break-time requirement that serve to strengthen protection to
breastfeeding employees. A few states specify that the time must be provided
"in order to maintain milk supply and comfort."'02 Not only does such
language recognize the physiological need to express milk, but also the
woman's comfort level. Some states are also more specific regarding the
frequency and duration of a "reasonable" break. 103 For example, Oregon
96 See Fact Sheet #73: Break Time for Nursing Mothers Under the FLSA, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIVsioN, July 2010,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs73.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet #73].
97Id
98 29 U.S.C.A. § 207; see also Fact Sheet #73, supra note 96.
99 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(r)(1)(3).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 2009 Ark. Acts, Act 621. H.B. 1552 (2009) (emphasis added); D.C. CODE § 2-
1402.82(d)(1) (2007) (requiring that employers provide reasonable daily unpaid break
periods "as required by the employee .. ,. to maintain milk supply and comfort").
103 See OR. REV. STAT. § 653.077(l)(c) (2007); P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 29, § 478a
(2009) (requiring most private employers to provide an hour during the workday to
breastfeed or express milk, which may be divided into two thirty-minute sessions or three
twenty-minute sessions, but allowing small business to provide only a half-hour of break
time for expressing milk during each work day); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, § 1466(5)(a)
(2009) (requiring public employers to provide, as a "fringe benefit," a half-hour of paid
break time, which may be distributed into two fifteen-minute sessions within the full-time
work day for breastfeeding or the expression of milk). Although a proposed version of
New York's law specified a minimum amount of time that would be considered
reasonable-one hour of unpaid break time within each eight-hour work period for the
first twelve months of the child's life-the version that ultimately passed used the vague
"1reasonable time" language. See S. 45, 222d Leg., I1st Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
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requires thirty-minute breaks to express milk in the middle of each four-hour
work period or other reasonable rest periods as agreed to by the employer
and employee.' 04 As long as this is not less often than the mother needs, as
the federal law requires,' 05 then this provision could provide nursing
employees with more firequent breaks. In addition to requiring a private
location, a few states also require an employer to provide cold storage for
expressed milk.' 06 Some states also provide a maximum duration for
accommodation longer than the one-year federal requirement. 107 The new
law is a significant improvement for working mothers, 108 and state laws that
provide even more protection will continue to benefit women in those states.
C. The Missing Element: A Non-Discrimination Provision
While the accommodation requirements of the proposed Breastfeeding
Promotion Act and the enacted Health Care Reform are identical, the latter is
missing an important element that was present in the former: a prohibition on
discrimination on the basis of lactation.109 This is important for several
reasons. First, some employers may seek to avoid the requirements of the law
by refusing to hire employees who are more likely to demand
accommodation. Second, even if employers provide the required
104 OR. REv. STAT. § 653.077(1)(c) (2007).
105 29 U.S.C.A. § 207 (requiring reasonable break time "each time such employee
has need to express the milk").
106 See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 5-10-6-2(b), 22-2-14(2)(b) (2010) (requiring public
employers to provide cold storage for expressed milk and private employers to provide
cold storage or allow the employee to provide her own cold storage space for keeping
expressed milk).
107 See COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-13.5-104(1) (2008) (requiring reasonable break time
to express milk for up to two years after the child's birth); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 604 (2009) (up to three years following the child's birth); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29,
§ 478b (2009), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, § 1466(5)(b) (2009) (for one year after the
employee's return to her position, not just after the birth of the child); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
2 1, § 305(a)(1) (2008) (up to three years after the child's birth).
108 Indeed, many commentators have advocated for passage of national legislation
as the solution. See Christrup, supra note 79, at 494 ("The best option for maintaining
workplace equality and encouraging breastfeeding is the requirement that employers
accommodate breast-pumping."); Goodman, supra note 26, at 146 ("[A] federal statute
protecting [expressing breast milk at work] would offer the best solution."); Lisa Hansen,
Note, A Comprehensive Framework for Accommodating Nursing Mothers in the
Workplace, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 885, 905-08 (2007) ("[E]nacting a national law means a
woman's right to breastfeed or express breast milk in the workplace will no longer be tied
to her state of residence."); Alison Reuter, Comment, Subtle But Pervasive:
Discrimination Against Mothers and Pregnant Women in the Workplace, 33 FoRDHAM
URB. L.J. 1369, 14 18-20 (2006) (proposing a "Parental Discrimination Act").
109 See supra Part III.B.
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accommodations, employees exercising their rights under the law may face
adverse employment actions in other aspects of their jobs, such as restricted
opportunities for promotion, less flexible scheduling, or lower wage
increases. Third, many working mothers are not covered by the new law.
Because it applies only to those employees not exempt from overtime,
salaried employees have no protection under this law. Finally, if an employer
does not provide the required accommodation, it is unclear how the law will
be enforced. A prohibition on discrimination on the basis of lactation would
provide a cause of action for employees seeking recourse for an employer's
failure to comply with the law or for those employees who are not within the
law's coverage. With no explicit non-discrimination provision included in
the enacted law, the lactating employee must look to either state law or other
federal laws under which such discrimination may be covered.
D. Inconsistent Protection Against Discrimination: State Legislation
Prior to the enactment of Health Care Reform, state legislatures have
been the most responsive to the need to protect lactating and breastfeeding
women from employment discrimination. Treatment among the states,
however, has not been uniform, with wide variation in the levels of
protection afforded."10 While twenty-four states, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico have laws regarding breastfeeding or the expression of milk
in the workplace,"'1 only seven states have laws explicitly prohibiting
discrimination against breastfeeding or lactating women. 112
The reach of these provisions vary. Some states have a simple
prohibition on discrimination against mothers who express milk in the
11 Compare, e.g., 26 ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 604 (2009) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of expressing milk in the workplace and requiring employers
to provide reasonable daily unpaid breaks to express milk for up to three years following
the birth of a child, in a sanitary, private, and secure location other than a restroom stall),
with H.J. PiEs. 1, 57th Leg., 2003 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2003) ("encouragjing] breastfeeding
and commend[ing] employes... who make accommodations for breastfeeding mothers
whenever feasible"). More than half the states, twenty-six, do not have any workplace
breastfeeding laws.
I I Breasyfeeding Laws, supra note 83. Sixteen states (Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, and Vermont), the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico required accommodation on the part of employers prior to the
enactment of the federal law. Id Georgia, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming recommended or encouraged
accommodation. See id.
112 Those states are Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, New York,
and the District of Columbia. Id
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workplace."13 Others prohibit "adverse employment action" against an
employee exercising her rights to express milk in the workplace.114 Even
more extensive provisions prohibit "refus[al] to hire or employ or to bar or
discharge from employment, or withhold pay, demote, or penalize" an
employee who expresses milk in the workplace."15 The District of Columbia
took a different approach than many states by amending the Human Rights
Act of 1977 definition of discrimination on the basis of sex to include
breastfeeding. 16
Even with accommodation now required by federal law, recourse for the
employer's failure to comply or adverse action against employees exercising
these rights may still be limited without some measure prohibiting
discrimination. If an employee's ability to enforce her rights is limited to
what is provided by state laws, only seven states have made clear that she is
protected. Again, this national issue requires a national solution and
arguments under existing federal law are necessary unless Congress makes
clear that discrimination on the basis of lactation is prohibited.
IV. PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND) BREASTFEEDING
UNDER TITLE VII
Currently, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its amendment,
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), do not appear to protect
women faced with adverse employment actions because of a need to express
breast milk at work."17 This section examines the history and development of
113 COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.5-104(1) (2008); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 604
(2009) (employer "may not discriminate in any way against an employee who chooses to
express breast milk in the workplace"); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 206-c (2007) (employer may
not discriminate "in any way" against an employee who expresses breast milk in the
workplace).
114 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31 -40w(c) (2009) ("An employer shall not discriminate
against, discipline or take any adverse employment action against any employee because
such employee has elected to exercise her rights [to express milk in the workplace].").
115 HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2(7) (1999) (amending the civil rights laws to make it an
unlawful employment practice "[flor any employer or labor organization to refuse to hire
or employ or to bar or discharge from employment, or withhold pay, demote, or penalize
a lactating employee because an employee breastfeeds or expresses milk at the
workplace"); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-215(2) (2010) (prohibiting public
employers from refusing to hire or employ, bar, or discharge any employee who
expresses milk in the workplace and from "discriminating] against an employee who
expresses milk in the workplace in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification").
116 D.C. CODE § 2-1401.05(a) (2007).
117 This Note focuses on the history and future of Title VII and the PDA as the most
likely statutes under which discrimination claims by working mothers may meet with
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Title VII and the PDA, as well as the subsequent interpretation of the PDA
by federal courts. An understanding of the early pregnancy discrimination
cases and failed attempts to bring breastfeeding discrimination under the
coverage of the same cause of action is necessary for determining how more
successful actions may be brought in the future.
A. The Basic Framework: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's .. . sex."118 Title VII
discrimination cases can generally be brought as either a disparate impact or
disparate treatment claim. 119 A disparate impact claim alleges that the effects
of a facially neutral policy fall more harshly on a protected class.' 20 For a
disparate treatment claim, the approach used more commonly by
breastfeeding and lactating workers, the plaintiff must show that an employer
treated her less favorably because of her sex, including pregnancy, childbirth,
some success. Unsuccessful attempts have been made to protect breastfeeding as a
constitutional privacy right. See Dike v. Sch. Bd., 650 F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 1981);
Christup, supra note 72, at 272 ("[Tlhe constitutional protection afforded by Dike has yet
to successfully protect a single breastfeeding worker and the doctrine appears to be
shrinking, not growing."). Claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 have also been unanimously rejected. See
Christup, supra note 72, at 269 ("[T]he FMLA is inapplicable to most women in the
workforce and still forces those women who are covered to choose between breastfeeding
and work."); Jendi B. Reiter, Accommodating Pregnancy and Breastfeeding in the
Workplace. Beyond the Civil Rights Paradigm, 9 Tx. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 5-6 (1999)
("Courts have repeatedly held that a normal, healthy pregnancy is not an ADA-qualifying
disability. The need to breastfeed appears even harder to fit within the statutory
language.").
118 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006).
119 See generally LEX K. LARSON, LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
(2009) (discussing disparate treatment theory in Part TV and disparate impact theory in
Part V); Abigail Levin, Cause of Action Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
US. CA. §§ 2000e et seq., for Sex Discrimination Based on Pregnancy, Childbirth, or
Related Medical Condition, in 40 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 645 (2009).
120 SeGriggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (197 1) ("The Act proscribes
not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation. The touchstone is business necessity."). While there are potential arguments to
be made for protection under a disparate impact analysis, this Note primarily focuses on
disparate treatment, the method of analysis used by most courts to date. This Note seeks
to demonstrate the flawed reasoning of prior disparate treatment cases while suggesting a
more appropriate analysis. See infra Part V.
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or related medical condition.' 2' The courts have generally refused to
recognize either claim by breastfeeding workers, holding that they are not a
protected class under Title V11 or the PDA, and often citing the Supreme
Court's pre-PDA analysis of Title VII in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.'122
1. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Title VII Sex Discrimination
and Pregnancy: General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
While it seems logical that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
would be discrimination "because of sex," the Supreme Court did not so
find.' 23 In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Supreme Court held that
pregnancy discrimination was not discrimination because of sex,
substantially limiting the reach of sex discrimination actions under Title
V1. 12 4 This decision reversed the Fourth Circuit, 125 which had upheld the
121 Levin, supra note 119, at 682-85.
122 Seinfra Part IV.B.
123 The district court in Gilbert, which was ultimately reversed by the Supreme
Court, found it "self evident" that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, which affects
only women and not men, is discrimination on the basis of sex. Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
375 F. Supp. 367, 381 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429
U.S. 125 (1976).
124 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976). The stage was set for the
Gilbert reasoning in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In Geduldig, the Court
rejected a challenge to California's disability insurance program, which provided benefits
to employees experiencing temporary disabilities not covered by worker's compensation,
but excluded from coverage compensation for any work loss due to normal pregnancy.
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494. Reversing the decision of the three-judge district court below,
the Court reasoned that the exclusion of a disability unique to women does not "amount[]
to invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause" because the program
"does not discriminate with respect to the persons or groups which are eligible for
disability insurance protection." Id While Geduldig was brought under the equal
protection clause, the Court's reasoning was applied to the Title V11 challenge of a
similar disability plan in Gilbert:
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed
to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other,
lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the
coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to
any other physical condition.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134-35 (quoting Geduldig, at 496-97 n.20).
125 Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 667 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125
(1976) ("[Defendant's] denial of pregnancy-related disability from the application of its
employee disability benefit program . .. falls clearly within the prohibitions of Title VI1
and Aiello confers no immunity for such denial.").
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district court decision 126 that an employer's disability plan that denied
benefits for disabilities arising from pregnancy violated Title V1i's provision
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex.'127 The Gilbert Court reasoned
that women, though they alone can get pregnant, were not discriminated
against because "'[tlhe program divides potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is
exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes."'1128 Thus,
because some women are not part of the disfavored group, the program
cannot be discrimination on the basis of sex: "'.There is no risk from which
men are protected and women are not."',129 The Court acknowledged that
there could be discrimination on the basis of sex, "should it be shown 'that
distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an
invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other,"" 30 but
the Court found no such indication in the case. 131
Gilbert generated two dissenting opinions: one by Justice Brennan, in
which Justice Marshall joined,' 32 and one by Justice Stevens. 133 Justice
Brennan sharply pointed out the Court's fallacy:
Indeed, the shallowness of the Court's "underinclusive" analysis is
transparent. Had General Electric assembled a catalogue of all ailments that
befall humanity, and then systematically proceeded to exclude from
coverage every disability that is female-specific or predominantly afflicts
women, the Court could still reason as here that the plan operates equally:
Women, like men, would be entitled to draw disability payments for their
circumcisions and prostatectomies, and neither sex could claim payment for
pregnancies, breast cancer, and the other excluded female-dominated
disabilities. Along similar lines, any disability that occurs
disproportionately in a particular group--sickle-cell anemia, for example-
could be freely excluded from the plan without troubling the Court's
analytical approach. 134
Justice Stevens simplified the analysis by observing that a policy that places
"6pregnancy in a class by itself. ... discriminates on account of sex; for it is
126 Gilbert, 375 F. Supp. at 386, afd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S.
125 (1976).
127 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 128.
128 I.at 135 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20).
129 Id. (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97).
130 I.(quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20).
131 Id at 140.
132 Id at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134 Id at 152 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1300 Vol. 71:6
2010] LA CTA TION DISCRIMNA TION 10
the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female
from the male."135 Justice Stevens rejected the majority's definition of the
two groups as pregnant women and nonpregnant persons, arguing that the
appropriate "classification is between persons who face a risk of pregnancy
and those who do not."'136
Thus, the strained analysis of the majority in Gilbert began a line of
reasoning still invoked by courts today in cases in which discrimination is
based on a factor disproportionately affecting some women and not men,
such as lactation and breastfeeding.' 37 As the dissents pointed out, the
majority thwarted Congress's intent in enacting Title VII.' 38 Congress
swiftly responded following the decision to correct the Court's interpretation
of Title VII, clarifying congressional intent.
2. Congress 's Response to Gilbert 's Majority: The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act
Congress responded to the Gilbert holding by enacting the PDA,13 9
which effectively overruled the decision. Enacted in 1978, just two years
after Gilbert was decided, the PDA amended Title VII's definition of sex
discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work.... 140
The express purpose of the PDA was to "change the definition of sex
discrimination in title VII to reflect the 'commonsense' view and to insure
that working women are protected against all forms of employment
135 Id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
136 Id. at 161-62 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137 See Diana Kasdan, Note, Reclaiming Title VII and the PDA: Prohibiting
Workplace Discrimination Against Breastfeeding Women, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 309, 324-
27 (2001) ("The appellate court rationales for rejecting breastfeeding-based claims thus
have been carried across several jurisdictions and have established a prevailing approach
to this question of law, with logic reminiscent of Gilbert.").
138 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146-62.
139 Gilbert was decided on December 7, 1976. The PDA was introduced in the
Senate four months later on March 15, 1977. S. REP. No. 95-33 1, at 3 (1977).
140 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
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discrimination based on sex."141 Both the House and Senate Reports rejected
the majority opinion in Gilbert1 4~2 and endorsed the dissents' expressions of
the "principle and meaning" of Title VII. 43 in a floor debate, Representative
Ronald Sarasin, a House bill manager, stated that the PDA gives a woman
"the rigt ... to be financially and legally protected before, during, and after
her pregnancy." 144 The House Report also discussed the potential breadth of
the Act: "In using the broad phrase 'women affected by pregnancy, childbirth
and related medical conditions,' the bill makes clear that its protection
extends to the whole range of matters concerning the childbearing
process."145 Thus, in enacting the PDA, Congress not only brought
pregnancy and related conditions into the express terms of Title VII, but also
clarified its intent that Title VII should be broadly construed to protect
working women from all forms of sex-based discrimination.
Subsequent to the enactment of the PDA, the Supreme Court concluded
that "[w]hen Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously
expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court
in the Gilbert decision." 146 Despite this clear rejection of Gilbert by
Congress and acknowledgement by the Supreme Court, lower courts have
continued to apply Gilbert reasoning to cases that courts find to be outside of
"pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."147 It is at the hand of
this reasoning that most of the breastfeeding/lactation discrimination cases
brought in federal courts have met their fate, despite the clear purpose of the
PDA to extend broad Title VII protection to women.148 Most federal courts
that have heard the issue have refused to find that breastfeeding, lactation,
and the need to express breast milk at work are protected by Title VII.14 9 An
examination of the major cases in this area is necessary to understand the
state of the law today and what counsel can learn from this body of law to
141 S. REP. No. 95-33 1, at 3 (emphasis added).
142 The Senate Report classified Gilbert as "threaten[ing] to undermine the central
purpose of the sex discrimination prohibitions of title VII." S. REP. No. 95-3 31, at 3.
143 S. REP. No. 95-33 1, at 2-3; H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 2 (1978) ("[Tlhe dissenting
Justices correctly interpreted the Act.").
144 124 CONG. REc. 38,574 (1978), reprinted in Comm. ON LABOR AND HUMAN
RESOURCES, LEGisLATivE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978:
PUBLic LAW 95-555, at 208 (1979) (emphasis added).
145 H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 5 (emphasis added).
146 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678
(1983) (emphasis added).
147 See infra Part IV.B.
148 See, e.g., Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 308, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
149 See cases discussed infra Part IV.B.
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help women who experience employment discrimination because of their
need to express milk in the workplace.
B. Title VII and PDA Breastfeeding Discrimination Litigation in the
Lower Federal Courts
This section discusses the major breastfeeding cases in federal courts
since enactment of the PDA. The progression of cases illustrates how the
reasoning of a few early cases arising out of one factual circumstance,
women seeking extended leave to breastfeed, has been repeatedly applied in
all cases bearing any relation to breastfeeding-including the "pumping"
cases in which women were not permitted to attend to the bodily function of
lactation at work.
Early breastfeeding cases brought under the PDA factually dealt with
women attempting to extend their maternity leaves so that they could
continue breastfeeding.'15 0 The first such case, Barrash v. Bowen, decided in
the Fourth Circuit, was brought by a female government employee whose
request for six months maternity leave to breastfeed her infant was denied by
her employer.'15' Her continued requests for leave were based upon a claim
of illness in order to fit within her employer's policy for granting leave.'152
The court determined that under the PDA "pregnancy and related conditions
must be treated as illnesses only when incapacitating. " 53 Because the
woman was not incapacitated, she was not entitled to additional leave.'154 The
appellate court also observed that while maternity leave of six months or
more granted to women decreased over a three-year period and six-month
leaves granted to men increased, "[o]ne can draw no valid comparison
between people, male and female, suffering extended incapacity from illness
or injury and young mothers wishing to nurse little babies."' 55 The court
went on to state the following:
Any limitation upon the liberality with which leave without pay had
been granted in earlier years would have an adverse impact upon young
mothers wishing to nurse their babies for six months, but that is not the kind
150 See, e.g., Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., No. 90-6259, 1991 WL 270823, at *1 (6th
Cir. Dec. 19, 1991); Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 928 (4th Cir. 1988).
'1' Barrash, 846 F.2d at 928.
152 Id at 928-29.
'13 Id. at 93 1.
'54 Id
155 Id. at 931-32.
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of disparate impact that would invalidate the rule, for it shows no less
favorable treatment of women than of men. 156
Even when breastfeeding is not a choice by the mother, but instead is the
only way that the child will accept nourishment, the plaintiffs claim has
been rejected out of failure to show medical necessity. 157 In Wallace v. Pyro
Mining, the only other breastfeeding employment discrimination case heard
by a circuit court to date, the plaintiff requested six weeks extended
maternity leave because her baby would only breastfeed.' 58 Her employer
refused to extend her leave and fired her when she refused to return to work
when required.' 59 Wallace sued, alleging violation of the PDA.' 60 The Sixth
Circuit rejected her PDA claim, stating that it did not need to determine if the
PDA applied because Wallace "failed to produce evidence supporting her
contention that breastfeeding her child was a medical necessity."'16' The
appellate court further concluded that she failed to show that her employer
"treated women less favorably than men. ... with respect to requests for
leaves of absence."' 62
Even when a plaintiff has been able to show the medical necessity of
breastfeeding for the child, courts have found the child's necessity
insufficient under the PDA.'63 In McNill v. New York City Department Of
Correction, the plaintiff alleged a violation of the PDA because she lost
certain discretionary benefits as a result of absences due to the need to
breastfeed her child, who could not bottle feed because of a cleft palate. 164
The court defined the issue as whether breastfeeding is "related to
'pregnancy, childbirth or [a] related medical condition' within the meaning
of the PDA."' 65 The court focused on the "related medical condition" of the
child, the cleft palate, and determined that a medical condition of the child
falls outside the PDA.'166 The court read Congress's intent regarding "related
medical conditions" as "limited to incapacitating conditions for which
medical care or treatment is usual and normal. Neither breast-feeding and
16I.at 932.
157 See Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., No. 90-6259, 1991 WL 270823, at *1-2 (6th
Cir. Dec. 19, 199 1).
158Id. at * 1.
160Id
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 McNill v. N.Y. City Dep't of Corr., 950 F. Supp. 564, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
161Id at 566--67.
165 Id.
16I.at 569-70.
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weaning, nor difficulties arising therefrom, constitute such conditions.",,6 7
Finally, the court concluded that "[tlhe PDA only provides protection based
on the condition of the mother-not the condition of the child" and that the
plaintiff whose child requires breastfeeding is, therefore, not a member of a
protected class.'168
Litigants seeking modified schedules, not extension of full maternity
leave, have also had their claims rejected.' 69 In Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, the
request of the employee-mother was not as burdensome to the employer as
those requesting extended leave, but was rejected nonetheless.' 70 The
plaintiff, a blackjack dealer in a casino, claimed she was refused a part-time
schedule to breastfeed her child and was subsequently fired.' 7 ' The court
rejected her Title V1I claim, holding that breastfeeding and other post-
pregnancy childrearing concerns are not "medical conditions related to
pregnancy or childbirth" within the scope of the PA172 Viewing
breastfeeding as only a matter of childcare, the court concluded that
"[n]othing in the PDA, or Title VII itself, obliges an employer to
accommodate the child-care concerns of breast-feeding workers."17 3
In the most recent cases, employees' requests to attend to their bodies'
lactation by expressing breast milk at work have also been rejected by courts
as not protected by the PDA. 17 In Jacobson v. Regent Assisted Living, the
plaintiff brought a disparate treatment claim based upon, among other things,
her employer's refusal to allow her to express her breast milk.' 75 On one
occasion, Jacobson's employer insisted that she go over work with him,
despite her stating that she needed to get home to feed her son.176 She was
then humriliated when her breasts became overly fuill and began to leak. 177 On
a second occasion, her employer insisted she attend a meeting with him in
167 Id. at 5 71.
168 Id
169 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Regent Assisted Living, Inc., No. CV-98-564-ST, 1999
WL 3 73 790, at *11I (D. Or. Apr. 9, 1999) ("Title VII and the PDA do not cover breast
feeding or childrearing concerns because they are not 'medical conditions related to
pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions."'); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc.,
960 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Colo. 1997) ("[B]reast-feeding and child rearing concerns
after pregnancy are not medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth within the
meaning of the PDA.").
110 Fejes, 960 F. Supp. at 1491-94.
'7' Id at 1490-91.
172 Id at 1492.
173 Id
174 See, e.g., Jacobson, 1999 WL 3 73790, at *11.
175 Id at *7.
176 Id at *4.
177 Id.
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another City.'17 8 She told him that she could not be away from home very long
because she was nursing and that she would need time to both pump her
breast milk and eat in order to keep up her nourishment.' 79 Her employer
gave her no breaks during the trip and "she was forced to sit on the plane
drenched in breast milk," which caused her both humiliation and pain from
the fullness of her breasts.'180
Despite this treatment, the court did not consider how lactation and the
need to express breast milk were different from the facts of previous cases in
which plaintiffs sought extended leave to breastfeed. Citing Fejes and
Wallace, the court dismissed the claim without consideration, stating the
following:
[T]o the extent that Jacobson bases her discrimination claim on her
assertion that [her employer] would not allow her to pump her breast milk,
she fails to state a claim. Title VII and the PDA do not cover breast feeding
or childrearing concemns because they are not "medical conditions related to
pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions." 181
In evaluating whether her employer's excuse for terminating her was
pretextual, the court stated that, rather than proving pretext, her employer's
refusal to allow her to pump her breast milk "proves only that [her employer]
treated a breast feeding woman the same as a man." 182
Similarly, in Martinez v. N.BC Inc., the plaintiff s claim was that her
employer insufficiently accommodated her need to pump her breast milk at
work.' 83 Invoking the reasoning of Gilbert, the court concluded that she
failed to state a claim under Title VII because "[tlhe drawing of distinctions
among persons of one gender on the basis of criteria that are immaterial to
the other .. . is not the sort of behavior covered by Title VII."'184 The court
further rejected her claim of sex-plus discrimination, 185 made on the basis of
sex plus the need to express milk, because there was no corresponding
subclass of men who could also be characterized by the need to express
178 Id
179Id
180 Jacobson, 1999 WL 373790, at *4.
181 Id. at * 11.
12I.at * 15.
183 Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
184 Id. at 309.
185 Sex-plus discrimination occurs when a person is subject to disparate treatment
based on sex in conjunction with a second characteristic. See Marjorie A. Shields,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Governmental or Private
Regulation of Breast-Feeding, 5 A.L.R. 6th 485, 491 (2005) (discussing federal courts'
treatment of breastfeeding under a sex-plus theory of discrimination).
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milk.' 86 The court determined that "[tlo allow a claim based on sex-plus
discrimination here would elevate breast milk pumping-alone-to a
protected status." 187 The decision refused to acknowledge that discrimination
based on a factor disproportionately affecting women-lactation, like
pregnancy-is discrimination on the basis of sex.
This review of the breastfeeding discrimination claims brought in federal
court under Title VII and the PDA may be discouraging, as those claims have
been largely unsuccessful. This is due, in part, to the scant number of
cases, 188 and the fact that only two circuits have heard breastfeeding
discrimination cases. 189 Moreover, only a limited number of legal theories
have been presented to courts, and others remain to be tried.'190
V. A NEW APPROACH To BREASTFEEDING AND LACTATION IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
While the new law for nursing mothers requires accommodation for
expressing milk, the level of protection for a lactating and breastfeeding
worker against discrimination largely depends upon the state in which the
employee resides. The federal courts have failed to interpret Title VII and the
PDA as offering any protection to breastfeeding and lactating mothers in the
workplace at a national level.'19' Similarly, Congress has failed to correct the
interpretations of the lower courts by either amending the PDA to clarify its
intent regarding breastfeeding and lactation or by including a non-
186 Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 3 10.
18 7 Id at 311.
188 Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table
decision); Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1988); Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F.
Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Jacobson v. Regent Assisted Living, Inc., No. CV-98-
564-ST, 1999 WL 373790 (D. Or. Apr. 9, 1999); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F.
Supp. 1487 (D. Colo. 1997); McNill v. N.Y. City Dep't of Corr., 950 F. Supp. 564
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
189 Wallace, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision); Bat-rash,
846 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1988).
190 See Christup, supra note 72, at 285 (arguing that "the strongest argument
available to a breastfeeding plaintiff under Title VII is one that is styled as a traditional
sex discrimination disparate treatment claim, but which relies on the PDA and Newport
News to explain why breastfeeding discrimination is sex discrimination"); Kasdan, supra
note 137, at 312 (arguing that breastfeeding discrimination is within the scope of the
PDA, based upon statutory language, legislative intent, and Supreme Court interpretation
of the PDA); see also infra Part V. While courts and commentators have focused largely
on disparate treatment analysis, claims brought under a disparate impact theory may also
be successful.
191 See supra Part IV.
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discrimination provision in Health Care Reform.'192 While some states have
made progress passing laws prohibiting lactation discrimination, 93 state
protection is dramatically inconsistent. 194 State protection from lactation
discrimination is simply inadequate-a national solution is required for this
critical, nationwide issue.] 95
Congress has already spoken in the PDA to nationally protect pregnancy,
childbirth, and related medical conditions.196 There are essentially two
options to achieve a national solution making clear that lactation is covered
by the PDA: either a decision from the Supreme Court or an act of Congress
explicitly prohibiting discrimination on the basis of lactation, which could be
achieved by amending the PDA, as was proposed by the Breastfeeding
Promotion Act. Successful Title VII-PDA cases in the lower courts may help
to achieve either of these outcomes. Potentially, divergent cases among the
circuits may propel the issue to the Supreme Court, which has not yet heard a
lactation discrimination case. When such a case is heard, either outcome may
ultimately benefit working mothers. If the Court adheres to the line of
reasoning articulated in this Note, it would make clear that lactation is
protected from discrimination under the PDA. Alternatively, if the Court
follows the Gilbert-like reasoning used by most lower courts to date, then
perhaps Congress will take the next step to protecting nursing women in the
workplace by explicitly prohibiting lactation-based discrimination. To
achieve the objective of getting a case to the Supreme Court, a legal theory to
overcome the decisions discussed in Part IV is needed.'197
192 See supra Part 111.
193 Indeed, many commentators have advocated that state action is the appropriate
solution to protecting nursing mothers in the workplace. See, e.g., Reiter, supra note 117,
at 22 ("State governments, with their broad power to legislate for the general welfare,
may be more suited for this task than the constitutionally limited federal
govenment ..... )
194 See supra Part III.D.
195 See supra Part 11. Promotion of breastfeeding is on the national health care
agenda. See Breasyfeeding Report Card, supra note 36. However, Healthy People 2010
objectives are unlikely to be achieved without a national solution that fully addresses the
needs of breastfeeding mothers in the workplace as career plans are the most significant
factor in determining a woman's choices regarding breastfeeding. See National Business
Group on Health, supra note 60, at 1.3.196 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
197 The theory that follows is based upon a disparate treatment analysis. However, it
should be noted that disparate impact is also fertile ground for further research of
potential legal theories for lactation discrimination claims. Even if a court determines that
lactation discrimination is not protected as sex or pregnancy discrimination, if an
employers' actions regarding workplace lactation disproportionately affect women, then
litigants could still argue a disparate impact sex discrimination claim.
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A concurring opinion in a recent Ohio Supreme Court case provides
some new reasoning for legal arguments in this area. 198 By focusing on the
physiological process of lactation, rather than the act of breastfeeding, the
opinion comes to the conclusion that the Ohio PDA, which contains nearly
identical language to the federal PDA, protects women from discrimination
based on lactation.' 99 This approach should be advanced by litigants and
followed by courts because it corresponds with the realities of the biological
nexus between pregnancy and lactation and is consistent with the language
and legislative history of the PDA.
A. A View from the Supreme Court of Ohio: Allen v. Totes/Isotoner
Corp.
In August of 2009, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued its decision in
Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., a case brought under Ohio's equivalent of the
PDA. 200 Ohio's statute contains nearly identical language to Title VII:
[T]he terms "because of sex" and "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, any illness arising out of
and occurring during the course of a pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions. Women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work.... 201
Allen, whose story is discussed in this Note's introduction,202 was terminated
for "taking an unauthorized, additional break" when she left her work station
198 Allen v. Totesllsotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
19I.at 630.
200 Allen v. Totes/isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009) (per curiam).
201 OHio REv. CODE § 4112.01(B) (2007). The only difference between this
language and the language of the federal PDA is the addition of "any illness arising out of
and occurring during the course of a pregnancy" to the list of prohibited bases for
discrimination in the Ohio Revised Code. Compare Onio REv. CODE § 4112.01(B), with
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). This difference is not significant for purposes of this discussion
because it was not the relevant language in the case. The language discussed in the case,
"1women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes," is common to both the Ohio Revised
Code and the federal PDA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); OHio REV. CODE § 4112.0 1(B).
202 See supra Part I.
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to express her milk.2 03 Every employee was permitted unscheduled restroomn
breaks as needed between scheduled breaks.204
In a per curiam opinion, the majority avoided the issue. The case
presented an opportunity for the Ohio Supreme Court to clarify for working
mothers in Ohio whether they are protected under Ohio law from
discrimination on the basis of lactation.205 The court, however, avoided the
issue by deciding that Allen was fired, not because of lactation or
breastfeeding, but because she violated her employer's rules by taking an
additional, unauthorized break. 206
Not all justices agreed with the reasoning of the decision. Justice
O'Connor concurred only in the judgment, writing separately. 207 Unlike the
per curiam opinion, Justice O'Connor's opinion addressed the issue of
whether the Ohio law prohibits an employer from discriminating against a
female employee because of or on the basis of lactation. 208 in a departure
from the reasoning of the federal courts regarding the similar language of
Title V1I, Justice O'Connor concluded that "given the physiological aspects
of lactation, . .. lactation also has a clear, undeniable nexus with pregnancy
and with childbirth. Therefore, it necessarily follows that lactation is
'because of or on the basis of pregnancy' and that women who are lactating
are women 'affected by pregnancy [or] childbirth."'12 09 Justice O'Connor
explicitly refused to apply the rationale of Gilbert, on the basis of the Ohio
legislature's "clear and unambiguous" rejection of the Gilbert reasoning in
203 Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., No. CVO6-03-09 17, 2007 V& 5843192 (Ohio
Corn. Pl. July 31, 2007), affid, Butler App. No. CA2007-08-196 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 7,
2008), affd per curiam, 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009).
204 Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., Butler App. No. CA2007-09-196 (Ohio Ct. App.
Apr. 7, 2008), aff'd per curiam, 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009).
205 A lien, 915 N.E.2d at 623 ("Allen's ... appeal .. , sought review of the issue
whether Ohio law prohibits an employer from discriminating against a female employee
because of or on the basis of lactation."). Ohio is currently one of the twenty-six states
without any law regarding lactation in the workplace.
206 Id. at 624 ("[T]he evidence in the record demonstrates that Allen took
unauthorized breaks from her workstation, and Isotoner discharged her for doing so....
Consequently, this court does not reach the issue whether alleged discrimination due to
lactation is included within the scope of Ohio's employment-discrimination
statute .")
27d.at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Chief Justice Moyer joined
her opinion. Id. (Moyer, CTJ, concurring in judgment).
208 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("I write separately to set forth why I
would hold that lactation falls within the scope of [the Ohio statute] and that the statute
prohibits employment discrimination against lactating women.").
29I.at 630 (quoting Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D.
Ill. 1994)).
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adopting the PDA following Congress's lead. 210 Unlike the federal courts,
Justice O'Connor analyzed the physiological process of lactation to
determine that a lactating woman is "affected by pregnancy [or] childbirth,"
and is, therefore, within the protection of the PDA. 211 Justice O'Connor,
nonetheless, concluded that Allen failed to develop a record from which a
jury could find in her favor, agreeing with the majority that Allen was
terminated simply for taking an unauthorized break*2 12
Justice Pfeifer dissented, agreeing with Justice O'Connor that lactation
discrimination is covered under Ohio's PDA.2 13 Unlike Justice O'Connor,
Justice Pfeifer raised the question of why Allen's trips to the restroom to
attend to a bodily function were treated differently than restroom trips of
other employees outside scheduled breaks.214 He disagreed with the majority
that Allen's firing for what her employer claimed were unscheduled,
unauthorized breaks adequately disposed of the case.215 The separate views
in Allen v. Totes/Is otoner Corp. give employee litigants new reasoning
supporting their position that may find some success in the circuits that have
not yet heard the issue.
B. Distinguishing Lactation from Breastffeeding
Justice O'Connor's analysis 216 rests on an essential premise that federal
courts have overlooked: breastfeeding and lactation, quite simply, are not the
same thing. The term lactation describes "the formation and secretion of milk
by the mammary glands" 2' 7-that is, the process of milk production in the
210 Id at 628-29. interestingly, Justice O'Connor cited almost exclusively to federal
cases in her analysis, but did not mention any of the federal breastfeeding discrimination
cases cited in Part IV. One can only surmise that because she rejected the application of
the Gilbert reasoning to a lactation case, she did not find them persuasive in their
reasoning.
211 A lien, 915 N.E.2d at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
22I.at 625.
211 Id. at 633 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
2 14 Id. Justice O'Connor dismissed the argument in a sentence: "Allen was not
forbidden to take similar breaks, nor has she presented any evidence that any other
employee routinely used the bathroom for 15-minute breaks on a scheduled basis each
day." Id at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
215 Id at 633 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
216 Justice O'Connor's analysis was also endorsed by Chief Justice Moyer. Id. at
625 (Moyer, C.J., concurring in judgment). And Justice Pfeifer agreed with Justice
O'Connor's conclusion that lactation discrimination is unlawful in Ohio. See id. at 633
(Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
217 Allen, 915 N.E.2d at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (citing 1 Russ,
FREEMAN, & MCQUADE, ATrORNEYS MEDICAL ADVISOR § 4:5 (2008)).
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body.218 Lactation is stimulated by the rise and fall of various hormones
during and immediately following pregnancy.219 Breastfeeding, however, is
the act of feeding a baby from the mother's breast. 220 it is a method of
delivering nourishment to a child, a care-giving choice made by the child's
mother. This fundamental distinction is critical for a finding that lactating
women are "affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions"
and, therefore, "shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes. ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work."221 The body's physiological response to pregnancy and
childbirth is lactation; thus, a lactating woman is "affected by pregnancy
[and] childbirth."222
Opponents may argue, like the lower courts found in Allen,223 that
continued lactation is a condition that arises out of the choice to breastfeed,
rather than pregnancy. This argument is based upon the fact that while
pregnancy initially stimulates lactation, the process continues because of the
act of breastfeeding, which may be regarded as a childcare choice rather than
a condition related to pregnancy. 224 Whlile lactation certainly is related to
breastfeeding, as Justice O'Connor conceded,225 such an argument does not
change its relation to pregnancy and, therefore, its protection under the PDA.
It does not matter that lactation, while a condition related to pregnancy, is
one also related to the care-giving choice to breastfeed. Indeed, pregnancy
itself is often the result of a conscious choice, and yet, such a choice has no
bearing on protection of pregnancy under the law.22 6 Lactation is the natural
result of pregnancy or childbirth. Thus, a lactating woman is typically one
218 STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 958 (27th ed. 2000).
219 See Anna Edgar, Anatomy of a Working Breast, 22 NEw BEGINNINGs 44, 47
(2005).
2 20 MEJRUMAWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 153 (11 th ed. 2004). In support
of this argument that courts should distinguish between lactation and breastfeeding in
their pregnancy discrimination analysis, it is worth noting that the term "breastfeed" was
not located in any of the medical dictionaries consulted for this Note.
221 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
222 Id
223 Allen, 2007 WL 5843192 ("Allen's condition of lactating was not a condition
relating to pregnancy but rather a condition relating to breastfeeding.").
224 This reasoning is a remaining product of Gilbert. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (stating that pregnancy need not be covered under a disability
program because it is "often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition," rather than
a disease).
225 Allen, 915 N.E.2d at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgmnent).
226 See Kasdan, supra note 137, at 340 ("Simply put, the element of choice, or a
resulting benefit to the child, are not sound foundations for stripping breastfeeding of
protection under Title VII.")
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who is "affected by pregnancy [or] childbirth," 227 and is, therefore, protected
from discrimination on that basis.
When one focuses on lactation-the body's physiological response to
pregnancy-as the direct result of pregnancy, rather than what has been seen
as a parental choice on how best to nourish a baby, the earlier breastfeeding
cases in which women sought extended leave to breastfeed become readily
distinguishable from the modem "pumping" cases. This legal reasoning can
be applied both by women seeking to express milk at work as a function of
lactation, in the case of those employees not covered under the new law, or
those who are covered by the new law seeking redress from discrimination
on the basis of lactation and their choice to exercise their rights.228 Because
lactation is the body's natural physical response to pregnancy, unlike the
parental choice to breastfeed, lactation is more clearly related to pregnancy.
C. This Approach Is Consistent with Both the Language and
Legislative History of the PDA
The statutory language of the PDA is broad229 and was intended to be so
construed.230 The PDA prohibits discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions. 231 This list was not, however,
intended to be exhaustive as the preceding language, "are not limited to,"
indicates.232 Lactation falls within the coverage of the PDA as an
impermissible sex-based distinction for the same reasons that pregnancy and
childbirth are covered. It is similar to pregnancy and childbirth as a physical
distinction between men and women related to pregnancy, and, as such,
would be included under the broad language of the statute.
Lactation may also be read as a "medical condition" related to pregnancy
or childbirth, within the language of the PDA. The federal courts that have
heard breastfeeding and lactation discrimination cases have narrowly read the
language "on the basis of [pregnancy- or childbirth-]related medical
conditions"233 when concluding that lactation discrimination is not covered
by the PDA.2 34 Those courts refused to acknowledge that breastfeeding was a
227 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
228 The lactation-breastfeeding distinction also avoids the cultural bias expressed in
the language of some courts: that Title VII does not protect "young mothers wishing to
nurse little babies." Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 932 (4th Cir. 1988).
229 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
230 S. REP. No. 95-33 1, at 3 (1977).
231 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
232 Id.
233 Id
234 See cases cited supra note 188.
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medical condition related to pregnancy because it was not sufficiently
"incapacitating" or requiring "medical care or treatment."235 Lactation,
however, can be quite disabling when a woman is unable to relieve the
buildup of milk in the breasts, causing breast and back pain, plugged ducts,
and breast infection.236 Additionally, the language of a remedial statute such
as the PDA should be broadly construed. Determining that only
incapacitating conditions are medical conditions within the meaning of the
PDA ignores this rule of statutory interpretation. Diabetes is undoubtedly a
medical condition, but may not always be incapacitating and may not require
medical treatment if properly managed with diet and exercise. Similarly,
lactation is not always, but can be, incapacitating or require medical
attention, particularly when infrequent expression of milk leads to medical
complications.237 Thus, when the "related medical condition" is read broadly,
as it should be, lactation is properly considered a medical condition related to
pregnancy and childbirth.
As described in the previous section and by Justice O'Connor in Allen,
discrimination on the basis of lactation is properly regarded as discrimination
directly on the basis of pregnancy and childbirth.238 Justice O'Connor
concluded that discrimination on the basis of lactation was on the basis of
pregnancy, as the two are inextricably linked.239 She also cited the next
clause in the statute that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
puroses . .. as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work,"1240 concluding that lactating women are "affected by
pregnancy [or] childbirth."124' Unlike the act of breastfeeding, the
physiological process of lactation fits easily into any of these approaches to
statutory interpretation.
These readings of the statutory language are also supported by the
legislative intent stated in both the House and Senate reports. 242 The Senate
Report declared that the PDA was to "change the definition of sex
discrimination in Title VII to reflect the 'commonsense' view and to insure
235 See, e.g., McNill v. N.Y. City Dep't of Corr., 950 F. Supp. 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
236 LA LECHE LEAGUE INT'L, supra note 24, at 15 1.
2 37 Id.
238 Allen, 915 N.E.2d at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
240 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) (emphasis added).
241 A llen, 915 N.E.2d at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
242 For a more detailed treatment of the PDA legislative history as applied to
breastfeeding, see Kasdan, supra note 137, at 333-38. The analysis of legislative history
is equally, if not more so, applicable to lactation as to breastfeeding.
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that working women are protected against all forms of employment
discrimination based on sex."124 3 Lactation as an effect of pregnancy or
childbirth comports with "commonsense" understandings of lactation as part
of pregnancy and childbirth. 244 The House articulation of the intended reach
of the PDA is similarly broad, stating that the statutory language "makes
clear that its protection extends to the whole range of matters concerning the
childbearing process."245 Lactation, which is prompted by hormonal changes
caused by pregnancy and childbirth,246 is undeniably a "matter[] concerning
the childbearing process."1247
As courts have interpreted the PDA narrowly, they have excluded
breastfeeding, seen by courts as a childcare choice, from the PDA's
coverage. By focusing on lactation-the body's natural, physical response to
pregnancy-rather than breastfeeding-a caregiving choice by a mother-
courts should conclude that lactation is within the PDA. Unlike
breastfeeding, lactation is the inevitable result of pregnancy and childbirth
and cannot be properly separated. This reading of the PDA reflects the
biology of lactation, pregnancy, and childbirth and is consistent with the
expansive language and clear legislative history of the PDA.
VI. CONCLUSION
Women are prominent contributors in the workplace and to the national
economy. Because of their childbearing and child-nourishing ability, mothers
are in a unique position when it comes to caring for infant children when
returning to the workforce. Congress has taken the first step in mandating
employer accommodation of nursing mothers. Without protection from
discrimination on the basis of lactation, however, nursing mothers in the
workplace are not fully protected. A focus on lactation, rather than
breastfeeding, and a plain language argument of the PDA are still necessary
to ensure that lactating women who choose to exercise their rights under
Health Care Reform to express milk in the workplace are protected from
discrimination on that basis. In the absence of clear anti-discrimrination
243 S. REP. No. 95-33 1, at 3 (1977) (emphasis added).
244 An ABA Journal blog reported that the decision "ignite[ed] controversy over the
Internet" as the dismissal, which did not reach the issue, was "nonetheless being seen as a
blow to working moms." Martha Neil, Mom Loses Case Over Unauthorized J0 am.
Breast-Pumping Bathroom Break, ABA JOURNAL LABOR & EMPLOYMENT BLOG (Aug.
31, 2009, 5:42 PM),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/mom-loses-case-over-unauthorized_1 0_a.m._b
reast-pumping_ bathroom_break/.
245 H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 5 (1978).
246 See Edgar, supra note 219, at 47.
247 H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 5.
2010] 315
1316 OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 71:6
protection by Congress and inconsistent treatment in the states, working
mothers will continue to face discrimination and must rely on the existing
statutory framework. The analysis offered by this Note is one approach that
may bring about successful claims for working mothers who make the
difficult choice and personal sacrifice to provide the best nutrition for their
children while returning to the workforce.
